Roadmap
As of 3 November 2026. Order follows the project’s working plan; there are no dates.
- Protocol specification v1.
BridgeMintand the kUSDT token family on Kaspa L1, with 21 VM tests; theKCC20template matches the standard.- KasPool on Kaspa L1, with 12 VM tests.
KusdtVaultfor Ethereum and BNB Chain, with 83 Hardhat tests, reviewed line by line against the specification.- Transaction builders for every kUSDT and KasPool transaction, as a CLI and as WebAssembly.
- The full Kaspa-side flow, bridge and pool, accepted by a kaspad v2.1.0 simnet node.
- The signer and coordinator services, and a local end-to-end run of the whole bridge: two Hardhat chains, the simnet, 5 signers and the coordinator (deposit, mint, burn, release, healthy reserves, pool API).
- The monitor and guardian: in the local run it caught a forged 400 000 kUSDT mint and paused both vaults and the minter within seconds.
npm run local:stack, the whole stack kept running for the wallet and the web app.- The wallet extension, tested live against the local stack (not yet released).
- The web app, tested on the live stack and with the real wallet extension.
- Refunds, a load run, a rehearsal of the vault on mainnet forks, and an internal security review with its fixes.
- Deployment tooling: a services image, a testnet compose file and a runbook.
- The testnets: vaults on Sepolia and BSC testnet, genesis and pool on testnet-10, and the services, public since 4 November 2026 at kastools.com with a downloadable testnet wallet.
- This documentation site.
| # | Work |
|---|---|
| 1 | The mainnet package: deploy scripts dry-run, the checklists, and an operations runbook (keys, the Safe and its AccessManager, guardian, monitor alerts) |
Before mainnet
Section titled “Before mainnet”Every item of the mainnet checklist: five independent signer operators, external audits, the vault owner as an AccessManager under a Safe, legal review, live proof of reserves, and a genesis review by kascov.io. Mainnet deployments also need the project owner’s explicit approval.
Zero-knowledge light-client verification is the planned upgrade to the federated bridge: minting against a proof checked on-chain, rather than signer signatures. It is not part of v1. See Known limits.